























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table  1.  Comparing  the  voice  and  activities  of  bipedal/clothed  and  natural  animal 
characters. 
 













































All Books  46  14  30% 
Picture Books  24  10  42% 
 
  Animal narrators appear demographically across the sample, although, as shown 
in Table 2, most (70%) are found in picture books for younger children, including the 
two examples described above. One very interesting example of animal narration is I, 
Jack (2000), a fictional juvenile chapter book in which a heroic yellow Labrador retriever 
tells a complex story. In an “Interpreter’s Note” at the back, Patricia Finney 
acknowledges the influence of both Rudyard Kipling’s Thy Servant, A Dog (1930) and 
books on dog psychology in creating Jack’s voice. Finney uses variation in text font to 
effectively relay nonverbal communication between Jack and his Apedog pack (italic 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style) and Jack’s strength of feeling (font size). The communication itself is usually, but 
not always successful; however, it is recognizable as that between a dog and a human. 
For instance, after Jack is caught raiding the refrigerator for his pregnant ‘Pack Lady’ 
Petra, the dogs run away to find a nearby safe place for Petra to have her puppies. On 
the way home, Jack meets his human ‘Packleader’: 
Hi there, Packleader! Are you better? Why are you out of your nest and 
walking along the path, going ‘Phhheeeweeet!’ between your teeth . . . 
You should be resting in you nest, getting better from your nasty cold. 
  Oh. That’s nice, you were looking for me. Shall we go see Petra? 
She is very unfriendly, though. Can you smell her? There is Specialness 
happening in her tummy. It’s all very strange . . . 
  Packleader puts my leash on. He is barking lots now, very quickly. 
He is saying Bad Bad. He is calling me strange names. What is ‘vandal? 
What is ‘fiend’?” (84—85) 
  In Joyce Sidman’s The World According to Dog: Poems and Teen Voices (2003), 
poetic attempts are made to describe the interior world and dog‐ness of dogs. For 
example, in “Dog Lore” Sidman writes, “Patience and intensity/open the most doors.” 
(56) She also includes short prose narratives written by teens about dogs they have 
known. Many of these pieces describe very important relationships between themselves 
or their family and an individual dog. Sarah Miller (age 13) honors the memory of Bandy, 
an abandoned puppy found by Sarah’s unhappy teenaged mother. Bandy “helped my 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mother understand the importance of life and affection. She guided my mother to 
appreciating everything and everyone as much as possible.” (13) 
  In our relationships over time with other selves, whether those selves are human 
or animal, we grow and develop, and in the process come to understand the other self 
better as well. The knowledge gained about others and ourselves is used by writers in 
imaginatively creating characters and situations for them to act in. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  Recent scholarship in sociology, anthropology, and cognitive ethology converge 
to point to direct relationship as a way to apprehend to the largest degree the 
subjective self of nonhuman others, particularly nonhuman animals. 
Anthropomorphism, common sense, and folk psychology may all be, more or less, 
expressions of this relational way of knowing which, in Western civilization, enjoys the 
greatest authority in works of the imagination.  
  Historically, animals have been portrayed in two broad ways in children’s 
literature. As symbolic humans, animals are neutral stand‐ins who help young readers 
navigate life issues. As realistic animal characters, animal selves, they provide glimpses 
into a more‐than‐human world. Authors may, in imaginatively developing realistic 
animal characters, just as they do when creating human characters, employ the insights 
and knowledge gained through relationship and, in the process, mirror the world as we 
perceive it. 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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CORE SOURCES 
 
Allen, Colin, and Mark Bekoff. Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive 
Ethology. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997. 
  Allen and Bekoff begin by describing this volume as a synthesis of theoretical and 
empirical approaches to the study of nonhuman animal minds. They describe cognitive 
ethology as the systematic study of the information processing, beliefs, and 
consciousness of animals from comparative, evolutionary, and ecological perspectives. 
Charles Darwin’s mental continuity concept is central; answers to questions about 
shared cognitive and emotional characteristics across species will shed light on the 
nature and evolutionary development of mental and psychological capacities.  
  Animal behavior research through most of the twentieth century has been 
guided by the philosophy of empiricism and positivism in which meaning is dependent 
on reducing observable, verifiable experiences to logical constructions. The goal of 
psychological behaviorism is to control behavior and explain behavior patterns in a one‐
to‐one correspondence with physiological processes. As an overview of the 
development of cognitive ethology, Allen and Bekoff broadly describe the philosophy of 
naturalism, modern neo‐behaviorists, and classical ethologists, particularly Konrad 
Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen, who shared the 1973 Nobel Prize. 
  Donald Griffin, whose 1976 book The Question of Animal Awareness helped to 
establish the current field of cognitive ethology, was mainly concerned with animal 
consciousness and with creative and versatile behavior in animals as evidence for 
cognitive processing. According to Griffin, consciousness logically confers an enormous 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adaptive advantage of behavioral choice to individuals. Most cognitive ethologists have 
concentrated their research on finding evidence of animal intentionality reasoning that 
behavior which implies intentionality and goals, for instance play or injury‐feinting, also 
implies some form of memory or planning. 
  Criticisms in general directed at cognitive ethology include the accusation of 
falling back on causation by invisible agents (the ‘religion card’), the belief that animal 
minds are permanently closed to us, and the denial of evidence for stimulus‐free 
behavior (which implies internal motivation). In response, cognitive ethologists justify 
mental attributions because they are often the most parsimonious explanation for 
observations. They point to laboratory evidence of stimulus‐free behavior, especially in 
observational learning experiments. Allen and Bekoff claim that behaviorists often 
privilege the general over the specific as a consequence of the pressure for statistical 
averaging, thus ignoring significant behavioral variations. The material emphasis of 
empirical science is considered problematic as well because natural selection acts on 
functional, not material, properties. 
  Although generally very controversial, the concept of folk psychology can be 
defined in a manner that is uncontroversial. “Folk psychology consists of loose 
generalizations about mind and behavior that are reflected in what people say about 
mental states and actions.” (65) Recognizing that the mentalistic terminology used in 
folk psychological explanations is often not clearly defined and that no adequate 
framework for mental attribution exists, Allen and Bekoff propose re‐conceptualizing 
folk psychology. They see it as a ‘prototheory’ that addresses consciousness and the 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semantic properties of its content with an evolutionary emphasis. Folk psychology 
shares with all cognitive approaches the idea that mental states have propositional 
content. 
  Case studies in canid social play behavior and the anti‐predatory behavior of 
birds are discussed in which emphasis is placed the importance of communication, 
change over time, and the correct interpretation of the intentions of others. 
In Chapter 8, Allen and Bekoff discuss animal consciousness. The authors advise 
fellow cognitive ethologists to move away from Thomas Nagel’s question, “What is it 
like to be . . .?” and focus instead on which species possesses conscious capacities by 
targeting behaviors that indicate consciousness.   
  
Bird‐David, Nurit.  “ ‘Animism’ Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational 
Epistemology.” Current Anthropology 4 (1999): S67—S91. 
  Bird‐David revisits the anthropological concept of animism, noting that basic 
assumptions have changed very little since the introduction of the concept in the 
nineteenth century by Edward Tylor. Tracing the idea from its inception, Bird‐David 
discusses Tylor and his interest in the origins of religion, and subsequent treatments of 
animism by Emile Durkheim, Claude Lévi‐Strauss, and S. Guthrie. As part of her 
reevaluation, Bird‐David focuses on the concept of personhood and on ecological 
perception, presenting evidence from her fieldwork with the South Indian Nayaka 
people, in particular their description of ‘devaru’ as nonhuman people who interact with 
the Nayaka in daily life and during social events. 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 In order to describe what devaru are, Bird‐David builds on anthropologist A. 
Irving Hallowell’s other‐than‐human‐persons (using instead her term ‘superpersons’) 
and M. Strathern’s ‘dividual’. Other‐than‐human‐persons are persons who are not 
human beings; they are considered persons as and because they are social and willful 
beings, not because they look or talk like humans. A dividual is a person made up of 
relationships, and is not a bounded singularity set against others. During regularly held 
festivals or social events, local devaru appear through Nayaka performers to talk and 
interact with the others there. Devaru are also understood to be specific animals, plants, 
and other environmental features who interact with the Nayaka. Devaru are understood 
to exist in the world. 
  In order to make this more comprehensible, Bird‐David draws on J. J. Gibson’s 
ecological approach to visual perception in which things “are perceived in terms of what 
they afford the actor‐perceiver because of what they are for him.” (Gibson, S74) For the 
Nayaka, the environment is constantly changing as a result of interactions. What 
happens to animals, or other devaru characters “(or how they change) can affect or be 
affected by what happens to people (or how they change).” (S77) These changes 
confirm the existence of devaru. The skill of attention must be developed; in this way, 
the environment affords information that can be “more and more subtle, elaborate, and 
precise. Knowing is developing this skill.” (Gibson, S78) Bird‐David calls communication 
of this kind ‘two‐way responsive relatedness.’ 
  She goes on to theorize that relational ways of knowing (knowing connected 
with being) is a universal human capacity that enjoys primary authority in most hunter‐
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gatherer societies and often secondary authority elsewhere. As a way of knowing, 
relational epistemology is complementary with objectivist; Bird‐David considers both to 
be real and valid and both to have limits. 
  Comments from seven scholars in anthropology appear at the end of the article 
proper, most in agreement in general or on major specific points. Tim Ingold offers an 
alternative explanation to that of Bird‐David’s on the origins of relational ways of 
knowing. Theories of the evolution of social intelligence offered by Bird‐David, according 
to Ingold, “rest fair and square on a modernist conception of mind and behavior” 
(Ingold, S82) that functions to undermine animistic perception by dividing the world into 
natural and social and by assuming that life and mind are interior properties of 
individuals. “Human beings everywhere perceive their environments in the responsive 
mode not because of innate cognitive predisposition but because to perceive at all they 
must already be situated in a world and committed to the relationships this entails.” 
(Ingold, S82) 
 
Boyd, Brian. “Tails Within Tales.” In Knowing Animals, edited by Laurence Simmons and 
Philip Armstrong, 217—43. Boston: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007.  
  Boyd asks why we are so fascinated by ‘tails within tales.’ After listing wide‐
ranging examples of animals in art through time and currently popular non‐human 
literary others, Boyd tells the story of George Herriman’s celebrated comic Krazy Kat. 
Originally occupying just the bottom strips in the panels of a ‘plodding’ human story, 
The Dingbats, Krazy, Ignatz the Mouse, and Offissa Pupp, broke away three years later 
to become “a wildly surreal and poetic series of scratchy non‐sequiturs . . . a story of 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animals liberating the imagination.” (219) Boyd then compares the two Genesis 
accounts in the Old Testament calling the first “a rationalist’s account” that reflects the 
Great Chain of Being and the second “a much more earthy world” emphasizing 
companionship with animals all around the human couple.  
Employing an evolutionary psychological explanation for this fascination, Boyd 
notes that animals (including humans) must be able to recognize and interpret other 
animals and further, that motion is immediately or initially interpreted as agency, thus 
considered the basic model of causality. In support, Boyd describes a classic 1944 
psychological study in which students were shown a short silent film with moving 
geometric shapes and asked to describe what they had seen. Researchers Fritz Heidler 
and Marianne Simmel reported that only one respondent spoke of geometric shapes; all 
the other respondents ‘anthropomorphized’ the moving figures. Significantly, this took 
the form of story in which “aims and moods” were assigned as well as genders and 
voices.  
  Because children are often considered to be growing through earlier stages of 
human development when, it is supposed, humans were closer to other animals, they 
are especially drawn to animals. They understand animals as fictitiously standing in for 
them and for other people. “Yet when a menagerie of absurdly different species speak 
to one another, in Dr. Seuss or Dr. Doolittle, children also accept that as in one sense 
perfectly natural, since they can see that animals do have to take account of the 
purposes of other creatures around them.” (225) 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 Animals continue to appear significantly in serious adult fiction as well. Boyd 
describes several reasons for this: They are similar to and different from us and also 
different from each other, stimulating the imagination; they play many roles in our lives 
with them; and they evoke many strong feelings. Because for us they are mute “unable 
to explain themselves . . . we have attributed to them a whole range of properties.” 
(227) 
  In the Western tradition, animals have been understood as ‘sub‐souls’ since 
Heraclitus, Plato, and Descartes. “Living under a monotheistic and anthropocentric 
religion and in cities where we rely on mechanical rather than biological power, 
Westerners have tended more and more to stress the distinction between human and 
animal, to define ‘humane’ as opposed to ‘bestial’ . . . and even—and in the twentieth 
century, too! —to despise ‘savages’ for their reverence toward animals.” (228)  
In the last several pages of this article, Boyd discusses many examples of serious 
adult literature including The Tempest, Joyce’s Ulysses, Anna Karenina, and Moby Dick; 
authors like Jonathan Swift, H. G. Wells, Franz Kafka, Julio Cortázar, Angela Carter, and 
Will Self; and even the comic strips Far Side and Calvin and Hobbes to illustrate how 
pervasively in literature animals are used to help us define who we are and to wrestle 
with the ambiguous borderland between ourselves and other animals. 
 
Brown, Joseph Epes. Animals of the Soul: Sacred Animals of the Oglala Sioux. Rockport, 
MA: Element, Inc., 1992. 
  Brown focuses on the importance of animals for the Lakota in his description of 
traditional Lakota “metaphysics of nature.” Brown writes that the ‘metaphysics’ are 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defined separately by each group in great detail and are specific to the local 
geographical features and species. Responsibilities and interrelationships are spelled out 
clearly. Relationships with the ‘vast web of being’ are established and strengthened 
through specific rites and prayers, through the form and materials of the built lodge, 
and through the use of the pipe. Any manifestation of the spirit, especially animals, can 
teach or otherwise communicate with people; they want to communicate, but human 
beings “must do the greater part to ensure an understanding.” (22)   
Communication often comes during dreams and visions, when a different level 
of cognition is accessed, considered more real than that of regular waking 
consciousness. Both sleeping dreams and waking visions, such as those received during 
the Vision Quest (Hanblecheyapi) are considered equally powerful. Most dreams and 
visions include encounters with a range of animal representatives and tutelary spirits. 
These are understood as ‘hypothetical’ animals or the spirit of the animal that lives 
behind the manifested world and is part of the Great Spirit of creation. Once one has 
received a vision, the subjective experience of that vision must then be relayed to a holy 
person or healer who interprets it and prescribes action. The recipient is obliged to 
share the experience, generally through performance, with the rest of the people in 
order to activate any power transmitted.  
  With the proper attitude of humility, one can request specific powers or ask for 
guidance on a specific problem during a quest. Individual dreamers may receive songs, 
rituals, or other teachings; personal names; or powers to heal, among other gifts. Much 
depends on the “persistence, receptivity, or capabilities of the individual.” (56) The 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animal spirits are not understood as controlling human destiny, but more as witnesses 
to it.   
Brown discusses Lakota animal categories and traditional systems of association 
that link certain animals and other powers or forces together, often based on behavior 
or effect. For example, Whirlwind is associated with the power to confuse or disorient 
and, being two‐leggeds, birds and humans are closely associated. 
  Traditionally animals are observed closely in daily life, their powers and 
behaviors sometimes becoming models for ideal human behavior. For example, bison 
are observed to take great care of the young, and so provide a model for human 
parenting. Due to this animist approach shaping their worldview over many centuries, 
many Lakota people have a profound understanding of their natural environment as a 
physical as well as spirit reality.  
 
Burke, Carolyn A., and Joby G. Copenhaver. “Animals as People in Children’s Literature.” 
Language Arts 81, no. 3 (January 2004): 205—13. 
  Burke and Copenhaver argue that childhood stories, especially those “personally 
significant” favorites that touched emotional chords and were read over and over, 
addressed needs that may not have been clearly understood. The authors are 
concerned with children’s literature as a ‘thinking device,’ helping children to make 
sense, understand values, and generate questions about life. ‘Thinking device’ functions 
in children’s literature are a modern trend, reflecting modern conceptions of the 
meaning of childhood as a time to “adapt, contribute to change, and critically explore 
issues and options.” (211) 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The high frequency of animal characters in these stories function to provide 
some distance, a ‘buffered engagement’ that allows children “to critically explore that 
which (they) would not be comfortable exploring directly.” (207)  
As a highly literary culture, we make use of texts regularly to organize our 
thoughts, relay values, and dialogue with each other. In many cases, for adults as well as 
for children, animal characters are there to help us wrestle with complex and 
emotionally difficult situations. The authors urge teachers and parents to consider this 
function of children’s literature and to use the appealing ‘anthropomorphic device’ of 
animal characters in developing curriculum and opening dialogue with children about 
issues of cultural significance. 
 
Burton, Lloyd. Worship and Wilderness: Culture, Religion, and Law in Public Lands 
Management. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002.  
  Burton examines the larger issue of religious use of U. S. public lands by 
examining and comparing religious practices of Native Americans and Euro‐Americans 
and how the practices and beliefs affect activism, law, and intercultural conflict. 
Throughout, Burton focuses on wild animals, particularly Bison, connecting these 
animals to law, spirituality, and cultural conflict for both Native people and Euro‐
Americans. In describing current conflicts over control of buffalo herds on public lands, 
Burton states that, “Environmental conservation groups and western ranching interests 
experience political and legal conflict in part because they are proceeding from 
profoundly different understandings of what the appropriate relationship between 
humankind and other living creatures ought to be.” (183) Euro‐American conservation 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groups, according to Burton, often have more in common with Native worldviews than 
with ranching, fishing, logging or any other industrial‐scale harvesting interests. 
In attempting to constructively address conflict, in which one perspective must 
win out, Burton discusses the possibility of more than one correct perspective. Burton 
argues for “simultaneously occurring ‘realms of knowing’ “ (9) and states further that 
two metaphors “may combine to form a perspective broad enough to meet the needs of 
both groups.” (27) 
  Burton links historical and modern religious movements in this country to a new 
re‐discovery of the sacred. During the westward expansion era, explorers into vast 
pristine wilderness areas experienced awe and reverence. The influence of nineteenth‐
century transcendentalism, authentic twentieth‐century transmission teachings of Asian 
traditions, and a growing appreciation and respect for traditional indigenous ways has 
set the stage for a serious reevaluation and “greening” of mainstream Christian and 
Jewish policy and interpretation. Sparked by concerns for environmental integrity and 
by Lynn White’s 1967 article (see below), many denominations and coalitions have 
issued policy statements “produced as a result of theological inquiry . . . (in which) the 
stewardship interpretation . . . seems to have carried the day.” (259) 
 
Daston, Lorraine, and Gregg Mitman, ed. Thinking With Animals: New Perspectives on 
Anthropomorphism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.  
  In this edited volume, anthropologists, philosophers, ethologists, historians, and 
artists examine how and why we think with animals and how humans and animals are 
transformed by these relationships. In the introduction, the editors describe the title as 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a having a ‘double meaning.’ Humans both “assume a community of thought and 
feelings” with a wide variety of animals and “recruit animals to symbolize, dramatize, 
and illuminate” experiences and fantasies.  
  Citing the widely acknowledged link between the “rise of modern science with 
the waning of anthropomorphic attitudes toward the natural world” (3), the editors list 
the types of reasons often given for avoiding anthropomorphic attributions including 
methodological (How can we know?), historical (attributions unsubstantiated in the lab), 
and even moral (narcissistic projections or laziness). Why do we continue to universally 
anthropomorphize? Because, say Daston and Mitman, it is useful for literary symbolism, 
for selling products, for wondering what being an animal is like. 
In her chapter, “Intelligences, Angelic, Animal, Human,” Lorraine Daston 
compares thirteenth‐century rational theologians’ attempts to understand the minds of 
nonhuman angels with that of animal behaviorists’ nineteenth century attempts to 
understand nonhuman animal minds. In both cases anthropomorphism is considered a 
problem, as the scholars necessarily relied on analogy. The term ‘anthropomorphism’ 
began as a designation for false attribution of human characteristics to God and was 
considered a sin, which may help to explain some of the moral condemnation that still 
exists in the charge. Both traditions were primarily interested in the thoughts and 
feelings of nonhuman others and both attempts, Daston states, arguably stretched the 
understanding of “the nature and limits of the human mind.” (39)  
  According to Paul White, in his contributing chapter “The Experimental Animal in 
Victorian Britain,” the nineteenth century saw a dramatic rise in both middle class pet 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keeping and in laboratory‐based investigation of comparative physiology using live 
animal subjects. White discusses some of the tensions this combination produced. For 
example, although the use of frogs in such experiments went unremarked, the use of 
domestic animals such as dogs, then present in many households, ‘triggered protests’ 
and claims that it was “treacherous and insensitive to commit such animals, who had 
been bred and trained up so as to place their confidence in humans to scientific use (and 
whose ways were) more winning . . .more really and intensely human . . .than the 
artificial, cold and selfish characters one meets too often in the guise of ladies and 
gentlemen.” (68)  
Many of the opponents of vivisection and other painful experiments worried 
about the brutalizing effects on the scientists themselves who designed and carried out 
procedures that caused “repeated and prolonged infliction of pain on helpless creatures 
(70). . . (with a) disciplined disregard for the feelings or perspective of the animal under 
study.” (75)  
Charles Darwin, Darwin’s disciple George Romanes, and others were, at this 
same time, collecting and classifying anecdotal evidence for mental and emotional 
continuity across species. This evidence, although dismissed by experimental scientists 
as sentimental nonsense, was effectively used to gather support by early animal rights 
and anticruelty activists.  
  In “People in Disguise: Anthropomorphism and the Human‐Pet Relationship,” 
James A. Serpell compares the effects on people and on animals of the human‐pet 
relationship. For people, the benefits are well documented; they include increased 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physical health and feelings of being loved and of belonging. Some of the effects on 
animals are not so clearly beneficial. Populations of domestic animals have boomed (as 
their wild counterparts’ populations have dwindled) and dogs, cats, and other common 
pets now occupy a novel ecological niche. Perhaps more disturbing are 
“anthropomorphic breeding selection” practices that attempt to create animals to cater 
to human whims and expectations. The English bulldog, for example, has been bred to 
have such a flat face that breathing problems occur, often resulting in premature death. 
Other examples include docking and declawing procedures, overdependence on 
humans to solve problems, anxiety and distress on being left alone, and human 
rejection of the animal for behavior that may be natural, but not in line with 
expectations. Serpell comments that anthropomorphism may be easy, but that 
appreciating ‘dog‐ness’ or ‘cat‐ness’ are special skills that need to be learned. 
 
Fisher, John Andrew. “The Myth of Anthropomorphism.” In Readings in Animal 
Cognition, edited by Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson, 3—16. Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1996. 
  The charge of anthropomorphism, with its implication of laziness, sloppiness, 
and sentimentality, is generally regarded as an embarrassment and an obstacle in the 
study of animal consciousness. Fisher argues that the fallacy of anthropomorphism “is 
neither well‐defined nor clearly fallacious.” (3) For example, Fisher asks, what are the 
uniquely human characteristics that are mistakenly attributed to non‐humans? There 
are indications the concept itself may be historically and culturally bound. The original 
theological meaning of attributing human characteristics to God has come to mean 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attributing human characteristics to nonhuman animals and objects. There is evidence 
that Japanese primatologists are unconcerned about anthropomorphic attributions.  
Fisher claims that theorists have different conceptions of anthropomorphism 
without being aware of it. As an attempt to disambiguate anthropomorphism, Fisher 
outlines a theoretical framework with two broad categories he labels Interpretive and 
Imaginative Anthropomorphism. Interpretive is meant to be explanatory, inferring that 
an animal is brave or sweet natured, for instance, from observing behavior. This 
category is subdivided into Categorical (inference is categorically inapplicable) and 
Situational (inference is inapplicable in this situation). A further subdivision of 
Categorical designates an inference anthropomorphic depending on species or on 
predicate (quality). 
  A range of positions critical to anthropomorphism may be taken from that of 
disallowing any inferences at all to disallowing certain species from consideration or 
certain predicates. Most critics view the universal human tendency to 
anthropomorphize as childish and overly imaginative, even dangerous, a return to 
unfounded superstition and invisible, immeasurable causes.    
Fisher replies that people do make distinctions among various species and that 
even children recognize the fictitious nature of humanized portrayals. “Common sense 
persistently refuses to draw a sharp line between humans and other animals, and 
persists in retaining sympathetic feelings for animals and in understanding them along 
human lines.” (11—12) It is entirely plausible, according to Fisher, that understanding 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one another using hardwired perceptions is an innate ability providing accurate 
information about other humans and nonhuman animals at least some of the time.  
 
Harvey, Graham. Animism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
  As Harvey states, the main purpose of his book is to take seriously “intimations 
that the term ‘person’ applies not only to humans . . . but to a far wider community” (xii) 
which may enrich debates about the environment and about consciousness. Harvey 
outlines and discusses ‘old’ animism, covering at some length “Tylor’s spirits,” 
“Durkheim’s totems,” and “Guthrie’s anthropomorphism,” before introducing ‘new’ 
animist concepts. “The ‘new animism,’ “ according to Harvey, “is less about attributing 
life and/or human‐likeness, than it is about seeking better forms of personhood in 
relationships.” (16) The ‘new animism’ begins with A. Irving Hallowell’s influential 1960 
article “Ojibwe Ontology, Behavior, and World View.” 
  Hallowell’s ‘other‐than‐human‐persons,’ a concept based on his fieldwork with 
the Ojibwa people, are those nonhumans defined by their interactions, their willfulness, 
and their sociability, rather than their physical or verbal likeness to human beings. The 
skills one needs in order to act as a person, that is respectfully, are learned over time 
and are seen more often in grown and elderly humans than in children.  For a specific 
example of this type of category, Hallowell uses the Ojibwa designation ‘grandfather,’ 
which is reserved for those, human and otherwise, who act like the grandfather ideal. 
“Grandfathers are those who are listened to, who communicate matters of significance, 
who inculcate respectful living, and teach skills. Grandfathers are persons with power 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and gifts to bestow.” (18) The categories of personhood described by Hallowell 
challenge modern, Western notions of what constitutes a person. 
  Harvey presents four case studies that illustrate the diversity of animist‐type 
beliefs and practices, looking in turn at Ojibwe language, Maori arts, Aboriginal law and 
land, and Eco‐Pagan activism. Animist issues regarding life events, ceremonial events, 
and ethics are covered next. Of particular interest are the chapters on personhood and 
consciousness. 
  As already mentioned, animists consider persons to be so based on 
communication and relationship. They are also significant in their particularity. It is with 
particular beings, whether a single deer, badger, rock, or tree, that engagement 
happens. Animist beliefs and practices are particular as well from one society to the 
next.  
  Harvey argues for the development of new terms to express new and newly 
discovered ideas. For example “knowing bodies” can be used to indicate the embodied 
nature of brains, selves, and consciousness. Many of these animist ideas are currently 
reflected by modern Western society in art and other works of the imagination. The 
authors and readers of modern literary movements such as magical realism and animist 
realism, emanating from recently colonized parts of the world, “resist dis‐enchantment 
and continue to enjoy living in a world that is not reduced to being a human artefact.” 
(207) 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Ingold, Tim. “Rethinking the Animate, Re‐Animating Thought.” Ethnos 71, no. 1 (2006): 
9—20. 
  “Animism (is) traditionally understood as ‘the imputation of life to inert objects’ 
that describes a typically western habit, though usually applied to indigenous peoples. 
Ingold argues that the conventional understanding is ‘misleading’ because animism is a 
condition of being and not a system of beliefs and that, due to the fluid nature of reality, 
‘animacy’ is also a condition with roots prior to any material differentiation. Animistic 
ontology can be more accurately understood as “a way of being that is alive and open to 
a world in continuous birth.” (9)   
Ingold discusses evidence that Western artists such as Paul Klee and Merleau‐
Ponty in their journals sometimes describe a similar openness.  
The painter’s relation to the world, Merleau‐Ponty writes, is not a 
simple, ‘physical‐optical’ one. That is, he does not gaze upon a world that 
is finite and complete, and proceed to fashion a representation of it. 
Rather, the relation is one of ‘continued birth’—these are Merleau‐
Ponty’s very words—as though at every moment the painter opened his 
eyes to the world for the first time.  His vision is not of things in a world, 
but of things becoming things, and of the world becoming a world. (12) 
Ingold goes on to describe animic relations as occurring on “trail along which life 
is lived” and not as something that occurs “between the organism ‘here’ and the 
environment ‘there’.” (13) Movement in this case is primary. Knowing is related to 
being, embedded in the very experience of being alive. By way of contrast, Ingold states 
that empirical science as a way of knowing “rests upon an impossible foundation 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(because its methods attempt to place inquiry) above and beyond the very world it 
claims to understand.” (19) 
 
Irvine, Leslie. If You Tame Me: Understanding Our Connection With Animals. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004. 
  Irvine’s book begins with the premise that animals are emotional and feeling 
beings and makes the argument that animals help shape our identities in relationship 
because they have selves with which our selves relate. The dimensions of this selfhood 
are mutually apprehended and strengthened during intersubjective interaction that 
exercises and challenges our relationship and emotional skills. Irvine argues that animals 
are conscious individuals; they are not interchangeable and they are self‐aware in a 
different way than we are. 
  Irvine borrows the specific elements of a core self that we share with other 
animals from William James’ four features of ‘I,’ refined with preverbal infant studies. 
The elements are agency (self control), coherence (integrity), affectivity (emotional 
capacity), and continuity (self history). The last element, continuity, connects, through 
memory, the other three into an individual subjectivity or individual self that 
intersubjectively interacts with other selves. Notice that none of this relies on spoken 
language; our ability to talk about it does, but not our ability to have the interactive 
relationships, sharing intentions, feelings, and thoughts with nonhuman others.  
According to Irvine, intentions can be individual or shared, feelings are emotional 
states, and thoughts in this context can be understood as the focus of attention. 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 Irvine discusses examples of these shared experiences. Play behavior, for 
instance, is a highly complex and coordinated activity in which communicating 
intentions and interpreting the intentions of others is crucial. A mood or context must 
be established that creates a protective ‘frame,’ often with signals such as the canine 
play bow. The famous ‘counting’ horse Clever Hans was discovered to be accurately 
reading the emotional signals from the people who came to see him perform. In this 
way, he ‘knew’ when the correct answer was reached. We share the focus of attention 
with dogs when we make eye contact in order to check in. Dogs guide the focus of 
human attention to the door or a food dish, indicating clearly what is on the dog’s mind 
or what the dog hopes will happen. 
  Other topics discussed by Irvine include animal domestication, the twentieth‐
century transition from ‘pet’ to ‘companion’ animal, animal relationships as resources 
for human self‐construction, and some of the deep implications for society in 
considering animals as other selves.  
 
Marchant, Jennifer. “ ‘An Advocate, a Defender, an Intimate’: Kristeva’s Imaginary 
Father in Fictional Girl‐Animal Relationships.” Children’s Literature Association 
Quarterly 30.1 (2005): 3—15. 
   In this article, Marchant discusses fictional bonds between adolescent girl 
protagonists and animals as a vital part of the psychic development for the human 
protagonist, providing a model for the adolescent reader navigating the same currents. 
During this period of adolescent development, called ‘abjection,’ boundaries are 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redefined, as the young girl is moving from the period of unity with her mother to 
greater autonomy and integration in the adult social order.  
According to Marchant, the animals (dogs, horses, and a dragon) appearing in 
her sample books are Kristevan Imaginary Father figures, father‐mother conglomerates 
with whom a direct and immediate identification is made, who provide a deeply 
satisfying love with boundaries, and who reflect and support ego ideals and adult 
standards. Although addressing a real need in the young reader’s life, it “seems likely 
that, for some readers, at least, much of the attraction is in the protagonist‐animal bond 
itself.” (14) 
 
Morgenstern, John. “Children and Other Talking Animals.” The Lion and the Unicorn 24 
(2000): 110—127. 
  Children’s literature is widely considered to be simple. In order to understand 
what constitutes this simplicity, Morgenstern compares C. S. Lewis’ use of talking 
animals in his children’s books (Chronicles of Narnia, 1950‐‐1956) and his adult science 
fiction Space Trilogy including Out of the Silent Planet (1938). He concludes from the 
texts and from Lewis’ own statements in interviews, that Lewis deliberately removed 
uncomfortable ambiguities about talking animals from his children’s books, and that this 
itself simplifies the story. The ambiguous feelings themselves are described as disgust 
about embodiment and uneasiness about the unclear boundaries between humans and 
animals.   
  Morgenstern distinguishes between an animal that talks, a flat characterization 
that evokes delight, and an alien talker, whom one is ‘tempted’ to think of as a man, and 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who therefore ‘becomes abominable’. The differences are subtle. “What is being 
asserted here is a difference that is not really a difference in the animal that talks but, as 
Lewis points out, a difference in ‘the point of view’ of the observer.” (112) Lewis makes 
another, related point: if one is “ ‘accustomed to more than one rational species’ “ (112) 
then there is no problem. 
   
Nagel, Thomas. “What is it like to be a bat?” The Philosophical Review, LXXXIII, 4 
(October 1974): 435—450. 
  Nagel describes conscious experience as a ‘widespread phenomenon’, 
attributing it to ‘many levels of animal life’ and yet, as he acknowledges, it is hard to 
know what evidence to capture or measure objectively in support of its existence. 
Certainly a waking conscious experience through an organism’s sense perceptions 
means that it is “something it is like to be that organism.” Nagel uses the example of a 
bat; they are mammals and yet their experience is very different from a human one due 
to its sensory apparatus and daily activities. This problem of accurately apprehending 
another’s experience appears intractable; that is, we cannot capture the experience of 
another with current methods of objective science. 
  The problem is not just species to species, but individual to individual. Because 
we are unable to separate ourselves from our own subjectivity, we cannot objectively 
approach another’s. Every “subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a 
single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will 
abandon that point of view.” (38) Nagel concludes his influential article by predicting 
that we may never be satisfied that we know another organism’s point of view fully, and 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that, since we are ‘restricted to the resources of our own mind’, we must rely on our 
imagination at present to describe another’s subjective point of view. 
   
Ristau, Carolyn A. ed. Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals: essays in honor of 
Donald R. Griffin. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 1991.   
  Part of a series called Comparative Cognition and Neuroscience; the papers 
collected here are from a 1987 symposium in animal cognition, authored by researchers 
and philosophers in cognitive ethology. Colin G. Beer addresses folk psychological terms 
and concepts, pointing out that the philosophical definition of intentionality is broader 
than that used by cognitive ethologists. He wonders if language‐based criteria are 
anthropocentric and whether they can be translated into nonlinguistic terms. Jonathan 
Bennett also discusses the intentional analysis of behavior, advocating multiple 
approaches as a way of developing a richer picture. Georg F. Michel covers many of the 
concerns about the ‘overrichness’ of folk psychological terminology and its failure to 
predict human behavior. Echoing Thomas Nagel, Sonja I. Yoerg and Alan C. Kamil remind 
us that one cannot have direct evidence of another’s consciousness. The authors draw a 
line of influence from Charles Darwin to Donald Griffin; both argue for the likelihood of 
mental continuity across animal species given the evolutionary continuity of so many 
other processes and structures. 
Other contributors discuss specific studies of conscious chimpanzee behavior 
(Allison Jolly), artificial language acquisition in parrots (Irene Pepperberg), and false 
signaling behavior (Dorothy L. Cheney and Robet M. Seyfarth; Peter Marler, Stephen 
Karakashian, and Marcel Gyger; W. John Smith). Carolyn A. Ristau and Gordon M. 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Burghardt each apply the folk psychological term ‘intentional stance’ to the anti‐
predator feinting behavior of shorebirds (Ristau) and hognose snakes (Burghardt), 
pointing out the purposeful or functional quality of the behavior and arguing that 
successful outcomes lead to reinforcement that, over evolutionary time, may support 
more voluntary control. 
Donald Griffin surveys the primary criticisms of cognitive ethology, including fluid 
term definitions and uneven critical standards, the belief that conscious thinking has no 
effect on behavior, the common dismissal of any evidence of conscious thinking in 
nonhuman animals, and the a priori assumption that subjectivity can never be known. 
These discouraging positions should be ignored, argues Griffin. Instead, cognitive 
ethologists should work to clarify elementary definitions of consciousness applied to 
animals by working on simple cases and asking what functions are served by behaviors. 
In particular, findings of cognitive creativity and enterprise support the view that 
animals have at least an elementary consciousness. 
 
White Jr., Lynn. “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis.” Science 155, no. 3767 
(1967): 1203—1207. 
  In four succinct pages, historian Lynn White discusses the tremendous impact 
humans have had on the natural environment through time, particularly in Northern 
and Western Europe. According to White, Christian axioms, such as that of ‘dominion,’ 
created an attitude of indifference to the destruction of the natural world, and 
combined with the Industrial Age fusion of science and technology, accelerated that 
destruction, producing the current environmental crisis. 
  49 
  From the medieval invention of heavier and more destructive plows that 
resulted in changing land distribution systems to the technical superiority that made 
possible the plundering of the known world by the “small, mutually hostile nations” of 
Europe, Western skills “in the development of power machinery, labor‐saving devices, 
and automation” remained consistent, continuing into the present day. 
  For these deeply entrenched reasons, White argues, the application of more 
science and technology will not avert further crises; root causes for our beliefs and 
actions must be understood. White declares that the triumph of Christianity over 
paganism was “the greatest psychic revolution in the history of our culture” and 
Christian beliefs, profoundly conditioning our views on human nature and destiny, must 
be reexamined. 
 
Wynne, Clive D. L.  Do Animals Think? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
  Wynne’s book contains chapters detailing animal studies in a variety of areas, 
including primate learning, language experiments, and problem solving; sensory 
perceptions of bats; insect communication; the symbolic meanings and roles of pigeons 
in various cultures; artificial language acquisition in birds; and dolphin perception and 
intelligence. He uses many examples throughout to support his contention that 
nonhuman animals are not intelligent or conscious in the unique way that humans are, 
but that much can be objectively understood about the nature and reality of animals 
and that much is shared between humans and other animals. 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 Many of the disagreements about animal awareness, cognition, and intelligence 
revolve around which qualities and capacities are shared and which distinct from 
species to species, and in particular, what characteristics are unique to human beings. 
To help in clarifying this important question, Wynne introduces what he calls the 
Similarity Sandwich, a three‐layer framework for understanding similarities and 
differences. The bottom (bread) layer asks the question, what is different?  All species 
are different, generally based on variety in anatomy and sense perceptions. The middle, 
or fixins, layer asks, what is shared? Some instincts and certain cognitive capacities like 
basic memory and concept formation seem to be similar across a wide spectrum of 
animal life. The top (bread) asks, what is nearly unique in humans? Here, Wynne 
suggests, can be placed the use of complex language and an independent self‐
awareness. 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APPENDIX A: SURVEY SAMPLE 
 
  The following is a chronological list of the 46 titles surveyed. They were taken 
from three bibliographies of recommended books about pets published on the website 
of the University of Illinois’ Center for Children’s Books. The original bibliographies were 
accessed in February 2010 at http://ccb.lis.illinois.edu/bibliographies.html. 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New York: Philomel Books, 2001.  
 
Graham, Bob. “Let’s Get a Pup!” Said Kate. Cambridge, Mass.: Candlewick Press, 2001.  
 
Holub, Joan. Why Do Cats Meow? New York: Dial Books for Young Readers, 2001. 
 
Holub, Joan. Why Do Dogs Bark? New York: Dial Books for Young Readers, 2001.  
 
Simont, Marc. The Stray Dog. New 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HarperCollins, 2001. 
 
Harvey, Amanda. Dog Eared. New York: Doubleday Book for 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New 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Cambridge, Mass.: 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Press, 
2003. 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and Dogs. 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Diego: 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2003. 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Kane/Miller, 2003.  
 
  52 
Little, Jean. Emma's Strange Pet. New 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